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ABSTRACT
A concept of operations for air trafﬁc management consists of a set of ﬂight rules and procedures aimed to keep
aircraft safely separated. This paper reports on the formal veriﬁcation of separation properties of the NASAʼ s Small Aircraft
Transportation System, Higher Volume Operations (SATS HVO) concept for non-towered, non-radar airports. Based on
a geometric description of the SATS HVO air space, we derive analytical formulas to compute spacing requirements on
nominal approaches. Then, we model the operational concept by a hybrid non-deterministic asynchronous state transition
system. Using an explicit state exploration technique, we show that the spacing requirements are always satisﬁed on
nominal approaches. All the mathematical development presented in this paper has been formally veriﬁed in the Prototype
Veriﬁcation System (PVS).
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INTRODUCTION
The safety objective of air trafﬁc management is to provide aircraft separation. This objective is achieved trough
air/ground equipment and a set of ﬂight rules and procedures, usually called concept of operations. Emerging and more
reliable surveillance and communication technologies have enabled new concepts where pilots and air trafﬁc controllers
share the responsibility for trafﬁc separation. One of such concepts is NASAʼ s Small Aircraft Transportation System (SATS),
Higher Volume Operation (SATS HVO) [Ref. 1].
The SATS program [Ref. 6] aims to increase access to small airports in the US during instrument approach operations.
Currently, under poor weather conditions, small airports are restricted to one-in/one-out operations. The SATS HVO
concept enables up to four simultaneous arrival approaches and multiple departures. A key aspect of the concept is that,
under nominal operations, aircraft are self-separated, i.e., pilots are responsible for separation without assistance of an air
trafﬁc controller. To this end, the SATS HVO concept designs the airspace surrounding the airport as a Self-Controlled Area
(SCA). A centralized, automated system, called the Airport Management Module (AMM), serves as an arbiter to aircraft
entering the SCA. In this concept, aircraft constantly broadcast their locations and, therefore, they have an updated view of
the SCA.
The SATS HVO operational concept is a collection of rules and procedures to be followed by aircraft operating or
transitioning in/out the SCA. For instance the concept of operations states when and how an aircraft is allowed to enter (or
leave) the SCA, when an aircraft is allowed to initiate the approach, and how to perform a missed approach. In order to
alleviate pilot workload and increase situation awareness, on board navigation tools provide advisories that assist pilots in
following these procedures.
Because the operational concept is a safety critical element of the SATS program, the task of showing that it satisﬁes
safety requirements is acomplished using formal mathematical analysis. A discrete mathematical model of the SATS HVO
operational concept is described in [Ref. 5]. That model was mechanically checked for safety and liveness properties. As
result of this research, several modiﬁcation were incorporated to the concept [Ref. 2].
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Figure 1: Top and side view of SCA
The discrete model in [Ref. 2, 5] is not precise enough to enable veriﬁcation of spacing properties. In this paper, we
described a hybrid model that extends the discrete model to take into account the geometry of the SCA and the aircraft
speed performances. Using this new model, we formally veriﬁed that the SATS HVO operational concept effectively
achieves self-separation, i.e., aircraft performing nominal approaches are safely separated according to minimum spacing
criteria.
HIGHER VOLUME OPERATIONS
In the SATS HVO concept, pilots operating within the Self-Controlled Area (SCA) are required to ﬂy by latitude/longitude
points in the space, called ﬁxes. Similar to a GPS-T approach [Ref. 3], ﬁxes are arranged as a T (see Figure 1).1 The ﬁxes at
the extremes of the T are called initial approach ﬁxes (IAFʼs) and they are the entry points to the SCA. The IAFʼs also serve
as missed approach holding ﬁxes (MAHFʼs), i.e., ﬁxes where aircraft will proceed in case they have to perform a missed
approach. The holding areas are located at 2000 feet and 3000 feet at the IAFʼs.
There are two types of entry procedures: vertical entry and lateral entry. In a vertical entry, an aircraft holds at 3000
feet until it is enabled to descend to 2000 feet. In a lateral entry an aircraft ﬂies directly to its IAF at 2000 feet. When the
aircraft is enabled to initiate the approach, it ﬂies to the intermediate ﬁx (IF), from there to the ﬁnal approach ﬁx (FAF), and
ﬁnally to the runway threshold. In case of a missed approach, the aircraft ﬂies to its assigned missed approach holding ﬁx
at the lowest available altitude (2000 or 3000 feet). Then, it re-initiates the approach and either follows a normal landing
procedure or leaves the SCA. The linear segments between the IAFs and the IF are called base segments and the segment
between the IF and the runway threshold is called ﬁnal segment. Henceforth, we say that an aircraft is on ﬁnal approach if
it is in the base of ﬁnal segments.
The Airport Management Module (AMM) is an automated centralized system that resides at the airport grounds. It
receives state information from aircraft in the vicinity of the airport and communicates with aircraft via data link. The AMM
provides entry clearances (vertical or lateral) and assigns missed approach holding ﬁxes. When an entry is granted by the
AMM, the aircraft receives a follow notiﬁcation and a missed approach holding ﬁx assignment. The follow notiﬁcation is
either none, if it is the ﬁrst aircraft in the landing sequence, or the identiﬁcation of a lead aircraft. Missed approach holding
ﬁxes are assigned by the AMM on an alternating basis. This technique ensures that consecutive aircraft on missed approach
are not ﬂying to the same MAHF.
1As it is usually depicted, right and left are relative to the pilot facing the runway, i.e., opposite from the readerʼs point of view.
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Figure 2: Discrete view of SCA
For nominal arrival operations, self-separation is achieved by requiring an aircraft to hold at its IAF until it meets a
spacing safety threshold with respect to its lead aircraft. The threshold shall guarantee a minimum separation during the
approach and during a missed approach, in case of this eventuality.
The concept of operations also describes nominal departure operations. However, for simplicity, the analysis presented
in this paper only considers arrival operations. This simpliﬁcation does not affect the result of the formal veriﬁcation as
arriving aircraft are geographically separated from departing aircraft and an aircraft cannot depart if there is an aircraft on
ﬁnal approach. The fact that departing aircraft are also separated can be veriﬁed using the techniques presented in this
paper.
DISCRETE MODEL AND ITS LIMITATIONS
The discrete model described in [Ref. 2, 5] is a mathematical abstraction of the SATS HVO concept. A simple way to
visualize that model is via an analogy with a board game where the board is a discretized SCA, the pieces that move across
the board are the aircraft, and the rules of the game are given by the concept of operations. This analogy is illustrated in
Figure 2. The places where an aircraft can be during an arrival operation are called zones. There are 12 zones:
• holding3 (left, right): Holding patterns at 3000 feet.
• holding2 (left, right): Holding patterns at 2000 feet.
• lez (left, right): Lateral entry zones.2
• base (left, right): Base segments.
• maz (left, right): Missed approach zones.
• final and runway: Final segment and runway.
An aircraft is always in one and only one zone, but several aircraft may be in the same zone. Aircraft leave the zones in the
same order as they arrive. The arrows in Figure 2 are the valid moves and they represent 15 ﬂight rules and procedures:
• Vertical entry (left, right): Initial move to holding3.
• Lateral entry (left, right): Initial move to lez.
• Descend (left, right): Move from holding3 to holding2.
2Lateral entry zones start outside the SCA.
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Figure 3: Indistinguishable discrete states
• Approach initiation (left, right): Move from holding2 to base.
• Final approach (left, right): Move from base to final.
• Landing: Move from final to runway.
• Missed approach initiation (left, right): Move from final to maz.
• Transition to lowest available altitude (left, right). Move from maz to either holding3 or holding2.
In this model, each aircraft is represented by its initial approach ﬁx (left or right), landing sequence (natural number),
and missed approach holding ﬁx assignment (left or right). Aircraft identiﬁcations are implicit as aircraft can be distin-
guished from each other by their landing sequence. The AMM is modeled by the next available landing sequence (natural
number) and the next alternating missed approach holding ﬁx (left or right).
The discrete model is conservative in the sense that it abstracts away the SCA geometry and physical performance
parameters of the aircraft. Hence, it includes scenarios that may no physically occur in the real world. We argue that the
model is complete, i.e., it includes all nominal operations. Of course, this cannot be proved formally. However, the model
has been extensively reviewed by the developers of the SATS HVO concept as it was used as a designing tool of the ﬁnal
concept [Ref. 2].
From a mathematical point of view, the discrete model is a state transition system where the states are snapshots of
the zones at discrete times and the transitions describe how the states evolve when the ﬂight procedures are applied. A
priori, there are no bounds on the number of aircraft in each zone; therefore, the transition system is potentially inﬁnite.
However, it turns out that the transition system is ﬁnite. Indeed, it was exhaustively explored [Ref. 5] using the veriﬁcation
system PVS [Ref. 7]. Among several other properties, it was formally veriﬁed that the model of the SATS HVO concept
allows up to four simultaneous arrival approaches, which is better than the current one-in/one-out mode of operation, and
that eventually all aircraft land or depart, i.e., there are no deadlocks.
The discrete model does not support veriﬁcation of spacing properties. In particular, the two states depicted in Figure 3
are indistinguishable by the discrete model, although they do not satisfy the same separation requirements. This behavior is
due to the way the approach initiation procedure was written in the discrete model. Indeed, the concept of operations states
that an aircraft may initiate the approach if (a) it is the ﬁrst aircraft in the landing sequence or (b) it meets a safety threshold
with respect to the lead aircraft, which is already on approach [Ref. 1]. There are several ways a pilot can check whether the
safety threshold is satisﬁed or not. In the most conservative case, the pilot has to delay the approach initiation until the lead
aircraft is within 6 nautical miles from the runway. The value 6 is for a nominal SCA where the base segments are 5 nautical
miles and the ﬁnal segment is 10 nautical miles. In the general case, this value is conﬁgurable according to the geometry of
the SCA. Since the geometry of the aircraft is not considered in the discrete model, the approach initiation procedure has to
be modiﬁed. The condition (a) rests the same. However, the discrete model uses a weaker condition (b) where an aircraft
can initiate the approach as soon as the lead aircraft is already on the ﬁnal approach (base or ﬁnal segments). As the safety
threshold is not checked, spacing properties cannot be veriﬁed using the discrete model.
In order to verify spacing properties, we need a more accurate modeling of the approach initiation procedure. To this
end, we extend the discrete model of the SATS HVO concept with continuous variables that encode the geometry of the
SCA and the aircraft speed performances. Before that, we formally specify the spacing requirements.
5T. Margaria, B. Steffen, and M.G. Hinchey
base(right)
final
2
A
Figure 4: Linear distance from IAF
SPACING REQUIREMENTS
The term spacing refers to linear separation of an aircraft with respect to a lead aircraft. If both aircraft are not ﬂying
the same approach, spacing is usually computed relative the merging point of their linear trajectories. For instance, in a
symmetric SCA, if the trail and lead aircraft are on opposite initial approach ﬁxes their spacing is 0, although their Euclidean
distance is twice the length of the of the base segments. Note that, independently of the initial Euclidean distance, if both
aircraft start the approach at roughly the same time and speed, they will have a conﬂict at the merging point.
Assume that the geometry of the SCA is described by base(left), base(right), ﬁnal , maz (left), and maz (right), which
are the lengths of the left and right base segments, ﬁnal segment, and left and right missed approach zones, respectively.
We deﬁne DA(t) as the linear distance at time t of an aircraft A from its initial approach ﬁx. For instance, in Figure 4,
DA(t) = base(right) + ﬁnal + 2. (1)
In a symmetric SCA, i.e., base(left) = base(right) and maz (left) = maz (right), the spacing at time t between an
aircraft A and its lead aircraft B is simply deﬁned as DB(t)−DA(t). However, in the general case, we must consider the
difference in length of the base segments. Hence, if B is before A in the landing sequence, the spacing between A and B
is deﬁned as
SA→B(t) ≡ DB(t)−DA(t) + base(iafA)− base(iafB). (2)
Now, we specify the spacing requirements to be formally veriﬁed.
Proposition 1. Under nominal operations, aircraft A and B on ﬁnal approach at time t, such that B is the lead aircraft of
A, satisfy the following spacing requirement:
ST ≤ SA→B(t). (3)
Proposition 2. Under nominal operations, A and B on ﬁnal approach, on missed approach at the same ﬁx at time t, such
that B is before A in the landing sequence, satisfy the following spacing requirement:
SMAZ ≤ SA→B(t). (4)
The constants ST and SMAZ are the theoretical spacing that the concept guarantees on ﬁnal approach and missed
approach, respectively. These constants are determined by the geometry of the SCA, the minimum and maximum speed of
the aircraft, i.e., vmin and vmax, and the initial spacing between the aircraft, i.e., S0, as follows:
ST ≡ S0 − (Lmax + ﬁnal − S0)∆v, (5)
SMAZ ≡ min(Lmin + ﬁnal − Lmaz∆v, 2S0 − (Lmax + ﬁnal + Lmaz − S0)∆v), (6)
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where
Lmin ≡ min(base(left), base(right)), (7)
Lmax ≡ max(base(left), base(right)), (8)
Lmaz ≡ max(maz (left), base(right)), (9)
∆v ≡
vmax − vmin
vmin
. (10)
HYBRID MODEL
The hybrid model of the SATS HVO concept extends the discrete state of the original model with the following
continuous variables:
• A current time t that evolves in a continuous way.
• For each aircraft A on ﬁnal approach or missed approach, the linear distance from its IAF, i.e., DA(t). We assume
that the speed of an aircraft may vary with time in the interval [vmin, vmax]. Therefore, the value of DA(t) is
constrained by
(t1 − t0)vmin ≤ DA(t1)−DA(t0) ≤ (t1 − t0)vmax, (11)
if t0 ≤ t1 (t0 and t1 are measured in the same approach operation).
These continuous variables allow us to state the approach initiation rule in a more precise way:
• Approach initiation for vertical and lateral entry (left and right): An aircraft A may initiate the approach when (a)
it is the ﬁrst aircraft in the landing sequence or (b) its lead aircraft B is already on the ﬁnal approach (base or ﬁnal
segments) and
S0 ≤ SA→B(t). (12)
Other transitions have to be modiﬁed as well to handle the new variables:
• Merging: An aircraft A in the base segment turns to the ﬁnal segment when
DA(t) = base(iafA). (13)
• Missed approach initiation: An aircraft A in the ﬁnal segment may go to the missed approach zone when it is the
ﬁrst aircraft in the landing sequence and
DA(t) = base(iafA) + ﬁnal . (14)
• Landing: An aircraft A in the ﬁnal segment may land if it is the ﬁrst aircraft in the landing sequence, there is no
other aircraft in the runway, and
DA(t) = base(iafA) + ﬁnal . (15)
• Determination of lowest available altitude (left and right): An aircraft A on missed approach may go to the holding
ﬁx at the lowest available altitude when
DA(t) = base(iafA) + ﬁnal +maz (mahfA). (16)
In the next section, we show how Propositions 1 and 2 can be mechanically veriﬁed on this hybrid transition system.
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MECHANICAL VERIFICATION
The discrete model of the SATS HVO concept was written in PVS and veriﬁed using a state exploration PVS tool
called Besc [Ref. 5]. Roughly speaking, Besc is a basic explicit model checker, written and formally veriﬁed in PVS.3 Early
attempts to analyze the hybrid transition system described in this paper, using a hybrid model checker, e.g., HyTech [Ref. 4],
were unsuccessful due to the complexity of the SATS HVO model. We tried a different approach: we encoded the hybrid
transition system as a discrete one and explored it using Besc.
We ﬁrst note that the discrete system is a valid abstraction of the SATS HVO concept. From a high level, all the
reachable states in the hybrid system are reachable in the discrete system (modulo the common discrete variables). Of
course, the converse is not true: not all the reachable states of the discrete system are reachable in the hybrid system; in
particular, those states violating the spacing requirements should not be reachable in the hybrid system. Therefore, if we
take all the reachable states in the discrete system and eliminate those that do not satisfy the continuous behavior expressed
by Formulas (12)–(16), we should still have a valid abstraction of the SATS HVO concept.
Instead of eliminating states, we simply add the continuous behavior as constraints to the reachable states in the discrete
system at the same time as the transitions take place. For instance, after a Merging rule, according to Formula (13), it should
hold that
base(iafA) ≤ DA(t) ≤ base(iafA) + ﬁnal . (17)
The semantics of a constrained state is that it is a valid reachable state if it is reachable in the discrete system and, moreover,
all its constraints hold. The veriﬁcation objective is to show that for each one of these hybrid reachable states, Propositions 1
and 2 hold.
Hybrid System as a Constrained Discrete System
In order to write the hybrid system as a discrete transition system, the continuous behaviors is encoded using symbolic
constraints. A PVS data type, called Constraint, is inductively deﬁned according to the following grammar:
A,B ::= 1, 2, . . . (18)
s ::= left | right | iafA | mahfA (19)
T ::= t | TA (20)
e, f ::= T |DA(T ) | base(s) | ﬁnal |maz (s) | S0 | Lmin | Lmax | Lmaz | SA→B(T ) | e+ f (21)
Constraint ::= e ≤ f (22)
We use the variable TA to denote the time when aircraft A initiates the approach.
The global state of the SCA is extended with a new ﬁeld constraints, which is a list of Constraints that hold
at a particular state. The hybrid transition system described before is encoded as follows:
• Approach initiation for vertical and lateral entry (left and right): Let A be the aircraft that initiates the approach.
The following symbolic constraints are added to constraints:
– The fact that A is in the base segment, i.e,
TA ≤ t, (23)
DA(t) ≤ base(iafA). (24)
– If B is the lead aircraft of A, the fact that the aircraft are spaced at time TA, i.e.,
TB ≤ TA, (25)
S0 ≤ SA→B(TA). (26)
– For all aircraft C on missed approach, the fact that C was ahead of A:
base(iafA) + ﬁnal ≤ DC(TA). (27)
3Besc is available from http://research.nianet.org/˜munoz/Besc.
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• Merging: Let A be that aircraft that goes into the ﬁnal segment. Constraint (24) is removed from constraints.
Moreover, the fact that A is in the ﬁnal segment is added to constraints:
DA(t) ≤ base(iafA) + ﬁnal . (28)
• Missed approach initiation: Let A be the aircraft that initiates the missed approach. Constraint (28) is removed from
constraints. Moreover, the fact that A is on missed approach is added to constraints:
DA(t) ≤ base(iafA) + ﬁnal +maz (mahfA). (29)
• Landing: Let A be the aircraft that is landing. All constraints related to A are removed from constraints except
instances of Constraints (25) and(26) when B, the previous lead aircraft of A, is on missed approach.
• Determination of lowest available altitude (left and right): Let A be the aircraft that goes to the lowest available
altitude. All constraints related to A are removed from constraints.
State Exploration
To verify Propositions 1 and 2, we have to prove the following invariant properties for every reachable state s.
Invariant 1. For each pair of aircraft A and B in s such that A and B are on ﬁnal approach at time t, and B is the lead
of aircraft A,
constraints(s) =⇒ ST ≤ SA→B(t). (30)
Invariant 2. For each pair of aircraft A and B in s such that they are on missed approach to the same ﬁx at time t, and B
is before A in the landing sequence,
constraints(s) =⇒ SMAZ ≤ SA→B(t). (31)
We remark that the constraints are just data without any logical meaning. Thus, the invariant properties cannot be
checked on the ﬂy during the state exploration process. The mechanical veriﬁcation proceeds in three different stages. In
the ﬁrst stage, the transition system is fully explored in PVS using the explicit model checker Besc. In order to get a ﬁnite
system, the constraints are implemented as a set rather than a list to avoid repetitions. Besc reports a total of 2768 reachable
states and a diameter, maximum length of a path, of 27 states.
In the second stage, we process the set of reachable states using an external tool called PVSio4 and generate a PVS
ﬁle where there is a lemma for each possible instance of Invariant 1 or Invariant 2. Without counting repetitions, 117
spacing lemmas were generated. From those, 73 lemmas are instances of the ﬁrst invariant and the remaining 44 lemmas
are instances of the second one.
In addition to the spacing lemmas, proof scripts, which automatically discharge these lemmas, are also generated. In
the ﬁnal stage of the mechanical veriﬁcation task, the proof scripts are checked in batch mode via the utilities provided by
ProofLite.5 After a couple of minutes, ProofLite reports that all 117 lemmas are proved in PVS.
The proof scripts that are automatically generated are based on three lemmas. One lemma, called T, takes care of
instances of Invariant 1. The other two lemmas, called Maz1 and Maz2, handle particular cases of Invariant 2. The rest of
this section sketches the proof of these lemmas.
Three Lemmas
The lemmas described here were mechanically checked in PVS. Afterward, they were integrated into a PVS strategy
that mechanically discharges the automatically generated spacing lemmas.
First, we present some auxiliary properties. The time when an aircraft A initiates the ﬁnal approach, i.e., when it enters
the base segment, is denoted TA. Hence, by deﬁnition,
DA(TA) = 0. (32)
4PVSio enhances the PVS ground evaluator with input/output operations. It is available from http://research.nianet.org/
˜munoz/PVSio.
5ProofLite is a PVS tool for non-interactive proof checking. It is available from http://research.nianet.org/˜munoz/
ProofLite.
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Therefore, Constraint (26) is equivalent to
S0 + base(iafB)− base(iafA) ≤ DB(TA). (33)
Furthermore, if A is on ﬁnal approach at time t, Constraint (24) and Constraint (28) yield
DA(t) ≤ base(iafA) + ﬁnal . (34)
Lemma 1 (T). Let A and B be aircraft on ﬁnal approach at time t such that B is the lead of aircraft A. It holds
S0 − (Lmax + ﬁnal − S0)∆v ≤ SA→B(t), (35)
under the hypotheses
TA ≤ t (36)
S0 + base(iafB)− base(iafA) ≤ DB(TA), (37)
DB(t) ≤ base(iafB) + ﬁnal . (38)
(Formula (36) is the Constraint (23), Formula (37) is the spacing constraint from Formula (33), and Formula (38) is the
instantiation of Formula (34) on aircraft B, which is on ﬁnal approach.)
Proof. Subtracting Formula (37) from Formula (38), we get
DB(t)−DB(TA) ≤ base(iafA) + ﬁnal − S0. (39)
Using Formula (11) on A and B,
(t− TA)vmin ≤ DB(t)−DB(TA), (40)
DA(t)−DA(TA) ≤ (t− TA)vmax. (41)
Formula 41 yields
DA(t) ≤ (t− TA)vmax. (42)
From Formulas (39) and (40),
t− TA ≤
base(iafA) + ﬁnal − S0
vmin
. (43)
Hence,
SA→B(t) = DB(t)−DA(t) + base(iafA)− base(iafB)
= DB(TA) + (DB(t)−DB(TA))−DA(t) + base(iafA)− base(iafB)
≥ S0 + (DB(t)−DB(TA))−DA(t), by Formula (37),
≥ S0 + (t− TA)vmin − (t− TA)vmax, by Formulas (40) and (42),
≥ S0 − (base(iafA) + ﬁnal − S0)
vmax − vmin
vmin
, by Formula (43),
≥ S0 − (Lmax + ﬁnal − S0)∆v, by Formulas (8) and (10).
Lemma 2 (Maz1). Let A and B be aircraft on missed approach at time t such that B is before A in the landing sequence.
Furthermore, assume that when A initiated the approach, B was on missed approach. It holds
Lmin + ﬁnal − Lmaz∆v ≤ SA→B(t), (44)
under the hypotheses
TA ≤ t (45)
DB(t) ≤ base(iafB) + ﬁnal +maz (mahfB), (46)
base(iafB) + ﬁnal ≤ DB(TA). (47)
(Formula (45) is the Constraint (23), Formula (46) is the instantiation of Constraint (29) on aircraft B, and Formula (47)
is the additional assumption about aircraft A and B.)
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Proof. Subtracting Formula (47) from Formula (46), we get
DB(t)−DB(TA) ≤ maz (mahfB). (48)
Formulas (40)–(42) are derived as in Lemma 1. From Formulas (40) and (48),
t− TA ≤
maz (mahfB)
vmin
. (49)
Hence,
SA→B(t) = DB(t)−DA(t) + base(iafA)− base(iafB)
= DB(TA) + (DB(t)−DB(TA))−DA(t) + base(iafA)− base(iafB)
≥ base(iafA) + ﬁnal + (DB(t)−DB(TA))−DA(t), by Formula (47),
≥ base(iafA) + ﬁnal + (t− TA)vmin − (t− TA)vmax, by Formulas (40) and (42),
≥ base(iafA) + ﬁnal −maz (mahfB)
vmax − vmin
vmin
, by Formula (49),
≥ Lmin + ﬁnal − Lmaz∆v, by Formulas (7), (9), and (10).
Lemma 3 (Maz2). Let A and B be aircraft on missed approach at time t such that B is before A in the landing sequence.
Furthermore, assume that when A initiated the approach, aircraft B and X where on ﬁnal approach, B was the lead of
aircraftX , andX was the lead aircraft of A. It holds
2S0 − (Lmax + ﬁnal + Lmaz − S0)∆v ≤ SA→B(t), (50)
under the hypotheses
TA ≤ t (51)
TX ≤ TA (52)
DB(t) ≤ base(iafB) + ﬁnal +maz (mahfB), (53)
S0 + base(iafB)− base(iafX) ≤ DB(TX), (54)
S0 + base(iafX)− base(iafA) ≤ DX(TA). (55)
(Formula (51) is the Constraint (23), Formula (52) is the instantiation of Constraint (25) on aircraftX andA, Formula (53)
is the instantiation of Constraint (29) on aircraft B, and Formulas (54) and (55) are the additional assumptions about
aircraft A, B, andX .)
Proof. Subtracting Formula (54) from Formulas (53), we get
DB(t)−DB(TX) ≤ base(iafX) + ﬁnal +maz (mahfB)− S0. (56)
Formula (42) is derived as in Lemma 1. From Formula (32), DX(TX) = 0. Therefore, using Formula (11) on X ,
DX(TA) ≤ (TA − TX)vmax. (57)
From Formulas (51) and (52), TX ≤ t. Using Formula (11) on B,
(t− TX)vmin ≤ DB(t)−DB(TX). (58)
From Formulas (56) and (58),
t− TX ≤
base(iafX) + ﬁnal +maz (mahfB)− S0
vmin
. (59)
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Hence,
SA→B(t) = DB(t)−DA(t) + base(iafA)− base(iafB)
= DB(TX) + (DB(t)−DB(TX))−DA(t) + base(iafA)− base(iafB)
≥ S0 + base(iafA)− base(iafX) + (DB(t)−DB(TX))−DA(t),
by Formula (54),
≥ S0 + base(iafA)− base(iafX) + (t− TX)vmin − (t− TA)vmax,
by Formulas (42) and (58),
= S0 + base(iafA)− base(iafX)− (t− Tx)(vmax − vmin) + (TA − TX)vmax
≥ S0 + base(iafA)− base(iafX)− (t− Tx)(vmax − vmin) +DX(TA),
by Formula (57),
≥ 2S0 − (t− Tx)(vmax − vmin), by Formula (55),
≥ 2S0 − (base(iafX) + ﬁnal +maz (mahfB)− S0)
vmax − vmin
vmin
,
by Formula (59),
≥ 2S0 − (Lmax + ﬁnal + Lmaz − S0)∆v, by Formulas (8), (9), and (10).
Note that the conclusions of Lemmas 2 and 3 could be replaced by
min(Lmin + ﬁnal − Lmaz∆v, 2S0 − (Lmax + ﬁnal + Lmaz − S0)∆v) ≤ SA→B(t). (60)
Furthermore,
SMAZ = 2S0 − (Lmax + ﬁnal + Lmaz − S0)∆v, (61)
when
1 +
vmin
vmax
≤
Lmin + ﬁnal
S0
, (62)
and
St ≤ SMAZ , (63)
when
Lmaz∆v ≤ S0. (64)
CONCLUSION
This papers proposes a hybrid model that extends the discrete model presented in [Ref. 2]. In contrast to the original
model, the proposed model enables the veriﬁcation of safety spacing requirements of SATS HVO operations. To this
end, aircraft performances, such as ground speed ranges, and information about the SCA geometry, such as length of
the approach segments, were integrated into the original model. Thus, in the hybrid model, the concept of operations is
described by the continuous dynamics of aircraft and the discrete events within the SCA. Using theorem proving and model
checking techniques, we have exhaustively explored the hybrid model and mechanically veriﬁed spacing requirements over
all nominal operations.
The SATS HVO development, excluding the PVS tools Besc, PVSio and ProofLite, is about 2800 lines of PVS speciﬁ-
cation and lemmas and 6500 lines of proofs. From these, 1600 lines of lemmas and 5900 lines of proofs were automatically
generated using the PVS tools.
From a practical point of view, the analytical formulas presented in this paper, e.g., Formulas (5) and (6), can be used
to conﬁgure a nominal SCA and the parameters of the baseline procedure for self-separation. For instance, consider a
12
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Figure 5: Nominal SCA
symmetric nominal SCA where base(left) = base(right) = 5 nm, ﬁnal = 10 nm, and maz (left) = maz (right) = 13 nm.
If the initial separation S0 is 6 nm and vmin = 90 kt, vmax = 120 kt, then
Lmin = Lmax = 5 nm, (65)
Lmaz = 13 nm, and (66)
∆v =
120− 90
90
=
1
3
. (67)
The value of ST is computed using Formula (5):
ST = 6−
5 + 10− 6
3
= 3 nm. (68)
This conﬁguration of the SCA satisﬁes Formula (62). Therefore, the value of SMAZ can computed using Formula (61):
SMAZ = 12−
5 + 10 + 13− 6
3
= 4.66 nm. (69)
Hence, if the initial spacing of the trail aircraft with respect to the lead aircraft is 6 nm, the SATS HVO concept of operations
guarantees a minimum spacing of 3 nm on ﬁnal approach and 4.66 nm on missed approach.
The analysis used in this paper can be extended to study Euclidean separation of aircraft on ﬁnal approach and missed
approach. Figure 5 illustrates a nominal SCA where aircraft on missed approach turn toward their missed approach zone α
degrees with respect to the runway, ﬂy a straight trajectory of M nautical miles, and then turn to their MAHF. A geometric
analysis reveals that
M =
min(ST , SMAZ )
2
(70)
achieves maximum separation for an arbitrary α. In this case, the minimum Euclidean distance Dα that the concept
guarantees for an aircraft on ﬁnal approach and an aircraft on missed approach is given by
Dα = M

2(1− cosα). (71)
In the example above, the optimal value of M , given by Formula (70), is 1.5 nm. The minimum Euclidean distance
between an aircraft on ﬁnal approach and an aircraft on missed approach, for different values of α, is computed using
Formula (71):
• D60o = 1.5 nm.
• D90o = 2.12 nm.
• D120o = 2.59 nm.
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Increasing the initial spacing S0 to 7 nm yields the following values: ST = 4.33 nm, SMAZ = 7 nm, M = 2.16 nm,
D60o = 2.16 nm, D90o = 3.06 nm, and D120o = 3.75 nm.
The mechanical veriﬁcation is necessary to make sure that no cases were forgotten. For instance, the fact that Lem-
mas 1, 2, and 3 are sufﬁcient to prove the spacing requirements for all nominal scenarios is shown by enumerating all the
possibilities (in this case 117) and mechanically proving all of them using these 3 lemmas. Formal proofs are the ultimate
guarantee that the mathematical development presented here is correct.
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